| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2872 |
| DP2872 Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes: What are the Stylized Facts? | |
| Torsten Persson; Guido Tabellini | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-07-01 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper characterises the unique Markov equilibrium in the sequential move, finite horizon pricing duopoly with discounting. Simple, short cycles repeat until the last two periods. For discount factors above 0.75488, there are three-period reaction function cycles and below 0.75488, two-period cycles. The equilibrium path in the latter case has continued E-undercutting at high prices, followed by infrequent but regular price wars. In a price war, a firm lowers all the way to a trigger level low enough to induce rivals to raise prices in the next period. While the price war is costly, both firms benefit in form of a higher market price in the following periods. Average long-run industry profits are bounded below by half the monopoly level, and are non-monotonic in the discount factor. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Price wars Finite games Discounting Sequential moves |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2872 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531912 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Torsten Persson,Guido Tabellini. DP2872 Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes: What are the Stylized Facts?. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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