| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2881 |
| DP2881 How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company? | |
| Leonardo Felli; Francesca Cornelli | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-07-09 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Much of the analysis of campaign contributions, in accordance with the Downsian model, has supposed that candidates seek contributions for electoral purposes. This paper takes the opposite approach, by assuming that each candidate aims to maximize the contributions he collects. We let a citizen contribute to a candidate with the aim of increasing that candidate's chances of winning. These assumptions generate several plausible results: in equilibrium citizens make campaign contributions; the positions the candidates adopt differ; the willingness of the rich to make larger contributions than the poor moves the candidates to adopt positions the wealthy prefer. A cap on political contributions reduces spending by voters, but also increases the divergence in the platforms adopted by the candidates. If some voters are richer than others, a cap will benefit the poor and hurt the rich, although the overall welfare implications are ambiguous. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Elections Political contributions Voting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2881 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531925 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Leonardo Felli,Francesca Cornelli. DP2881 How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company?. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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