| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2884 |
| DP2884 Drawing Lessons From the Boom of Temporary Jobs in Spain | |
| Juan Dolado; Juan Francisco Jimeno; Carlos Garcia-Serrano | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-07-17 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We investigate the effect of electoral rules and political regimes on fiscal policy outcomes in a panel of 61 democracies from 1960 onwards. In presidential regimes, the size of government is smaller and less responsive to income shocks, compared to parliamentary regimes. Under majoritarian elections, social transfers are smaller and aggregate spending less responsive to income shocks than under proportional elections. Institutions also shape electoral cycles: only in presidential regimes is fiscal adjustment delayed until after the elections, and only in proportional and parliamentary systems do social transfers expand around elections. Several of these empirical regularities are in line with recent theoretical work; others are still awaiting a theoretical explanation. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Constitution Politics Presidentialism Electoral rule Government spending |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2884 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531928 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Juan Dolado,Juan Francisco Jimeno,Carlos Garcia-Serrano. DP2884 Drawing Lessons From the Boom of Temporary Jobs in Spain. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
