| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2855 |
| DP2855 IPO Allocations: Discriminatory or Discretionary? | |
| Alexander Ljungqvist; William J Wilhelm Jr | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-07-18 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The restructuring of a bankrupt company often entails its sale. This Paper suggests a way to sell the company that maximizes the creditors' proceeds. The key to this proposal is the option left to the creditors to retain a fraction of the shares of the company. Indeed, by retaining the minority stake, creditors can transfer the control of the company while reducing to a minimum the rents that the sale of the company leaves in the hands of the buyer. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Bankruptcy Auctions Transfer of control Private benefits |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2855 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531931 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alexander Ljungqvist,William J Wilhelm Jr. DP2855 IPO Allocations: Discriminatory or Discretionary?. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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