G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP2899
DP2899 Incentives in Dynamic Duopoly
Xavier Vives; Byoung Jun
发表日期2001-07-23
出版年2001
语种英语
摘要This Paper examines how public debt, government credibility and external circumstances affect the probability of exchange rate devaluations in a three-period open-economy version of the Barro-Gordon (1983) model with nominal public debt. Public debt creates a link between current and future policy actions: resisting a crisis may enhance or undermine the sustainability of the exchange-rate regime depending on whether the government's reputation or fundamentals ? i.e. the level of public debt ? are critical for sustainability. The focus is on the impact of public debt, debt maturity and government credibility on the expected devaluation for the current and future periods. This allows us to identify factors affecting the short-term interest rate and the forward rate and hence to derive predictions on the level and the slope of the term structure of interest rates.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Credibility Nominal debt maturity Fixed exchange rates Yield curve
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp2899
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531936
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Xavier Vives,Byoung Jun. DP2899 Incentives in Dynamic Duopoly. 2001.
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