G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP2891
DP2891 Does a Currency Union Affect Trade? The Time Series Evidence
Andrew Rose; Reuven Glick
发表日期2001-07-26
出版年2001
语种英语
摘要We examine a Bertrand competition game between two intermediaries offering matching services between two sides of a market. Indirect network externalities arise as the probability of finding one's match with a given intermediary increase with the number of agents of the other side who use the services of this intermediary. We formalise some specificities of intermediation on the Internet by allowing registration and transaction prices, and multiple registration. When only registration fees are used and agents register to at most one cybermediary, there exists an equilibrium where one firm corners the market with positive profits, as well as zero profit equilibria where the firms share the market. Introducing either fees that are contingent on successful matching or the possibility of registration with two intermediaries drastically reduces the profits of a dominant firm. Moreover, with multiple registration, new types of positive-profit equilibria emerge where both matchmakers are active and one side of the market registers with both cybermediaries.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Intermediation Network externalities Matching Internet Competition
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp2891
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531940
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Andrew Rose,Reuven Glick. DP2891 Does a Currency Union Affect Trade? The Time Series Evidence. 2001.
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