| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP2891
|
| DP2891 Does a Currency Union Affect Trade? The Time Series Evidence |
| Andrew Rose; Reuven Glick
|
| 发表日期 | 2001-07-26
|
| 出版年 | 2001
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We examine a Bertrand competition game between two intermediaries offering matching services between two sides of a market. Indirect network externalities arise as the probability of finding one's match with a given intermediary increase with the number of agents of the other side who use the services of this intermediary. We formalise some specificities of intermediation on the Internet by allowing registration and transaction prices, and multiple registration. When only registration fees are used and agents register to at most one cybermediary, there exists an equilibrium where one firm corners the market with positive profits, as well as zero profit equilibria where the firms share the market. Introducing either fees that are contingent on successful matching or the possibility of registration with two intermediaries drastically reduces the profits of a dominant firm. Moreover, with multiple registration, new types of positive-profit equilibria emerge where both matchmakers are active and one side of the market registers with both cybermediaries. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Intermediation
Network externalities
Matching
Internet
Competition
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2891
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531940
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Andrew Rose,Reuven Glick. DP2891 Does a Currency Union Affect Trade? The Time Series Evidence. 2001.
|
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