| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2905 |
| DP2905 The Survival of the Welfare State | |
| Fabrizio Zilibotti; John Hassler; Kjetil Storesletten; José V Rodríguez Mora | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-08-01 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In a study of the ownership of German corporations, we find a strong relation between board turnover and corporate performance, little association between concentrations of ownership with managerial disciplining and only limited evidence that pyramid structures can be used for control purposes. The static relation of ownership to control in Germany is therefore similar to the UK and US. There are, however, marked differences in dynamic relations involving transfers of ownership. There is an active market in share blocks giving rise to changes in control, but the gains are limited and accrue solely to the holders of large blocks, not to minority investors. We provide evidence of low overall benefits from control changes and the exploitation of private benefits of control. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Ownership Control Board turnover Pyramiding Bank control Takeovers |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2905 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531945 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fabrizio Zilibotti,John Hassler,Kjetil Storesletten,et al. DP2905 The Survival of the Welfare State. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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