G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP2906
DP2906 Credit, the Stock Market and Oil: Forecasting US GDP
John Muellbauer; Luca Nunziata
发表日期2001-08-01
出版年2001
语种英语
摘要We compare steady states of open loop and locally stable Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) in a general symmetric differential game duopoly model with costs of adjustment. Strategic incentives depend on whether an increase in the state variable of a firm hurts or helps the rival and on whether there is intertemporal strategic substitutability or complementarity at the MPE. Furthermore, we characterize completely strategic incentives in the linear-quadratic specification of the model and find that when production (price) is costly to adjust there is intertemporal strategic substitutability (complementarity) and the steady state of the Markov perfect equilibrium is more (less) competitive than the steady state of the open-loop equilibrium, which coincides with the static outcome. In particular, in a differentiated product duopoly market with price competition and costly production adjustment the leadership attempts by each firm turn into Stackelberg price warfare yielding a MPE steady state outcome more competitive than static Bertrand competition. The static strategic complementarity in the price game is turned into intertemporal strategic substitutability.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Differential game Adjustment costs Product differentation Markov perfect equilibrium Open-loop equilibrium Cournot Bertrand Stackelberg warfare point
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp2906
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531946
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
John Muellbauer,Luca Nunziata. DP2906 Credit, the Stock Market and Oil: Forecasting US GDP. 2001.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[John Muellbauer]的文章
[Luca Nunziata]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[John Muellbauer]的文章
[Luca Nunziata]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[John Muellbauer]的文章
[Luca Nunziata]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。