| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2908 |
| DP2908 Buyers' Coordination and Entry | |
| Massimo Motta; Chiara Fumagalli | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-08-01 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Central bank policy suffers from time-inconsistency when facing a banking crisis: A bailout is optimal ex post but ex ante it should be limited to control moral hazard. Dollarization provides a credible commitment not to help at the cost of not helping even when it would be ex ante optimal to do so. Dollarization is preferable when the costs of establishing a reputation for the central bank are high, monitoring effort by the banker is important in improving returns, and when the cost of liquidating projects is moderate. A very severe moral hazard problem could make dollarization undesirable, however. The results obtained are applied to assess the desirability of dollarization in a range of countries and the potential role of the IMF as International LOLR. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Moral hazard Banking crisis Lender of last resort Liquidity Imf |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2908 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531948 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Massimo Motta,Chiara Fumagalli. DP2908 Buyers' Coordination and Entry. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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