| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2911 |
| DP2911 Information Sharing in Banking: A Collusive Device? | |
| Thomas Gehrig | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-08-05 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper elaborates on the recent race to sequence the human genome. Starting from the debate arising from the genome case on public versus private research, the Paper shows that in some fundamental research areas, where knowledge externalities play an important role, market and non-market allocation mechanisms do coexist and should coexist in order to ensure socially desirable achievements. A game-theoretic model makes it possible to demonstrate the above results and to characterize some features of an optimal research policy. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Science Technology Allocation mechanisms Intellectual property rights Welfare |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2911 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531953 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas Gehrig. DP2911 Information Sharing in Banking: A Collusive Device?. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Thomas Gehrig]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Thomas Gehrig]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Thomas Gehrig]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
