| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP2920
|
| DP2920 Financing and Corporate Growth under Repeated Moral Hazard |
| Ronald Anderson; Kjell Nyborg
|
| 发表日期 | 2001-08-15
|
| 出版年 | 2001
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We study the evolution of prices set by duopolists who are uncertain about the perceived degree of product differentiation. Customers sometimes view the products as close substitutes, sometimes as highly differentiated. As the informativeness of the quantities sold increases with the price differential, there is scope for active learning by firms. When information has low value to the firms, they charge the same price as would be set by myopic players, and there is no price dispersion. When firms value information more highly, on the other hand, they actively learn by creating price dispersion. Such price dispersion arises in a cyclical fashion, and is most likely to be observed when the firms' environment changes sufficiently often, but not too frequently. Firms' payoffs are higher when they use correlated pricing strategies. Contrary to what one might expect, such coordination need not hurt consumers, provided they are sufficiently impatient. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Duopoly experimentation
Bayesian learning
Stochastic differential game
Markov perfect equilibrium
Correlated equilibrium
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2920
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531963
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Ronald Anderson,Kjell Nyborg. DP2920 Financing and Corporate Growth under Repeated Moral Hazard. 2001.
|
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
