| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP2924
|
| DP2924 Public Education and the Melting Pot |
| Moshe Justman; Mark Gradstein
|
| 发表日期 | 2001-08-22
|
| 出版年 | 2001
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | In this paper we provide a characterization of the welfare properties of rational expectations equilibria of economies in
which, prior to trading, agents have some information over the realization of uncertainty. We study a model with
asymmetrically informed agents, treating symmetric information as a limiting case. Trade takes place in asset markets that
may or may not be complete. We show that equilibria are characterized by two forms of inefficiency, price inefficiency and
spanning inefficiency, and that generically both of them are present. Price inefficiency arises whenever equilibrium prices
reveal some information. It formalizes and generalizes the so-called Hirshleifer effect, by showing that generically an
interim Pareto improvement is possible even conditional on the information that is available to agents in equilibrium; the
primary source of the inefficiency is a pecuniary externality. Spanning inefficiency, on the other hand, arises if prices are
not fully revealing and markets are incomplete relative to the uncertainty faced by agents in equilibrium. In this case, an
ex-post improvement can generically be implemented by providing agents with more information, thus expanding their
risk-sharing opportunities and reducing informational asymmetries, even though this additional information restricts the set
of allocations that are incentive compatible and individually rational. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
|
| 关键词 | Asymmetric information
Incomplete markets
Rational expectations equilibrium
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2924
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531968
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Moshe Justman,Mark Gradstein. DP2924 Public Education and the Melting Pot. 2001.
|
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