| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2942 |
| DP2942 Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy Under Sticky Prices | |
| Martín Uribe; Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-09-09 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this Paper, we analyse the following policy dilemma: strategic trade policy versus free trade when the domestic government is bound to intervene only after the domestic firm's strategic variable is chosen. This intervention allows the domestic firm to manipulate the domestic government and results in a socially inefficient choice of the strategic variable. Commitment to free trade leads, however, to foregoing the benefits from profit shifting. Yet, from the social point of view, free trade may be optimal even under the assumption of symmetric information. Due to costly signalling, this result is reinforced in the case of asymmetric information. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Strategic trade policy Free trade First-best versus second-best policy Government's commitment Signalling |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2942 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531984 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martín Uribe,Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé. DP2942 Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy Under Sticky Prices. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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