| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2956 |
| DP2956 The European Contribution to International Financial Stability | |
| Richard Portes | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-09-14 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this Paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is the rule. When communication or informal sanctions are available, however, appropriation behaviour is more efficient. Our analysis shows that these regularities arise naturally when a fraction of the subjects exhibits reciprocal preferences. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Common pool resources Experiments Fairness Reciprocity Game theory Fairness models |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2956 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531985 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Richard Portes. DP2956 The European Contribution to International Financial Stability. 2001. |
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