| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2945 |
| DP2945 Monetary Policy Issues in a Low Inflation Environment | |
| José Viñals | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-09-19 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Banks are highly leveraged institutions, potentially attracted to speculative lending even without deposit insurance. A counterbalancing incentive to lend prudently is the risk of loss of charter value, which depends on future rents. We show in a dynamic model that current concentration does not reduce speculative lending, and may in fact increase it. In contrast, a policy of temporary increases in market concentration after a bank failure, by promoting a takeover of failed banks by a solvent institution, is very effective. By making speculative lending decisions strategic substitutes, it grants bankers an incentive to remain solvent. Subsequent entry policy fine-tunes the trade-off between the social costs of reduced competition and the gain in stability. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Banking crises Bank mergers Charter value Market structure dynamics Prudential regulation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2945 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531988 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | José Viñals. DP2945 Monetary Policy Issues in a Low Inflation Environment. 2001. |
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