| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2968 |
| DP2968 Using Employer Hiring Behaviour to Test the Educational Signalling Hypothesis | |
| Jan C. van Ours; James Albrecht | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-09-26 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper presents a test of the educational signalling hypothesis. If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants. We find that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, so we conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Recruitment Signalling |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2968 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/531999 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jan C. van Ours,James Albrecht. DP2968 Using Employer Hiring Behaviour to Test the Educational Signalling Hypothesis. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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