| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2986 |
| DP2986 Counselling and Monitoring of Unemployed Workers: Theory and Evidence from a Controlled Social Experiment | |
| Gerard Van den Berg; Bas van der Klaauw | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-10-04 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When firms cluster in the same local labour market, they face a trade-off between the benefits of labour pooling (i.e., access to workers whose knowledge helps reduce costs) and the costs of labour poaching (i.e., loss of some key workers to competition and the indirect effect of a higher wage bill to retain the others). We explore this trade-off in a duopoly game. Depending on market size and on the degree of horizontal differentiation between products, we characterize the strategic choices of firms regarding locations, wages, poaching and prices. Our results show that co-location, although it is always efficient, is not in general the equilibrium outcome. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Labour pooling Labour poaching Firm clustering Agglomeration |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2986 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532016 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gerard Van den Berg,Bas van der Klaauw. DP2986 Counselling and Monitoring of Unemployed Workers: Theory and Evidence from a Controlled Social Experiment. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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