| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3006 |
| DP3006 Federal Intervention to Enhance Shareholder Choice | |
| Lucian Arye Bebchuk; Allen Ferrell | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-10-05 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper shows that identical offers in an ultimatum game generate systematically different rejection rates depending on the other offers that are available to the proposer. This result casts doubt on the consequentialist practice in economics of defining the utility of an action solely in terms of the consequences of the action irrespective of the set of alternatives. It means, in particular, that negatively reciprocal behaviour cannot be fully captured by equity models that are exclusively based on preferences over the distribution of material pay-offs. Models that take into account players? fairness intentions and distributional preferences are consistent with our data while models that focus exclusively on intentions or on the distribution of material pay-offs are not. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Fairness Intentions Models of fairness |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3006 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532017 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lucian Arye Bebchuk,Allen Ferrell. DP3006 Federal Intervention to Enhance Shareholder Choice. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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