| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2991 |
| DP2991 Information Structures in Optimal Auctions | |
| Dirk Bergemann; Martin Pesendorfer | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-10-10 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper analyses the interaction between a common monetary policy and differentiated labour market institutions. We develop a model of a two country monetary union. In each country, labour market institutions are distinguished by the degree of centralization in wage bargaining. In each country the government can also use an instrument (general taxation or payroll taxes) to influence their overall labour costs. Finally a common monetary policy is followed in a ?conservative? manner, as defined by Rogoff (1985). The results show that structural and preference asymmetries matter, both in the determination of economic policy and in performance. In particular centralized labour market institutions confer a certain comparative advantage in policy making which provides a natural incentive for the less flexible (or less reformed) to want to join a currency union; and for the more flexible to stay outside. This lowers the incentives for reform inside the union, as Calmfors and others have conjectured. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Monetary union Labour market institutions Asymmetries |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2991 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532022 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dirk Bergemann,Martin Pesendorfer. DP2991 Information Structures in Optimal Auctions. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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