| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP2998 |
| DP2998 Capacity Choices in Liberalized Electricity Markets | |
| Georges Siotis; Pedro Luis Marín Uribe; Fidel Castro-Rodriguez | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-10-19 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A seller wishes to sell an object to one of multiple bidders. The valuations of the bidders are privately known. We consider the joint design problem in which the seller can decide the accuracy by which bidders learn their valuation and to whom to sell at what price. We establish that optimal information structures in an optimal auction exhibit a number of properties: (i) information structures can be represented by monotone partitions; (ii) the cardinality of each partition is finite; (iii) the partitions are asymmetric across agents. These properties imply that the optimal selling strategy of a seller can be implemented by a sequence of exclusive take-it or leave-it offers. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Optimal auction Private values Information structures Partitions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp2998 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532035 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Georges Siotis,Pedro Luis Marín Uribe,Fidel Castro-Rodriguez. DP2998 Capacity Choices in Liberalized Electricity Markets. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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