| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3003 |
| DP3003 Collective Decisions with Interdependent Valuations | |
| Hans Peter Grüner; Alexandra Kiel | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-10-27 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this Paper we provide experimental evidence indicating that incentive contracts may cause a strong crowding out of voluntary cooperation. This crowding-out effect constitutes costs of incentive provision that have been largely neglected by economists. In our experiments the crowding-out effect is so strong that the incentive contracts are less efficient than contracts without any incentives. Principals, nonetheless, prefer the incentive contracts because they allow them to appropriate a much larger share of the (smaller) total surplus and are, hence, more profitable for them. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Incentive contracts Reciprocity Incomplete contracts Voluntary cooperation Experiments |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3003 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532065 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Peter Grüner,Alexandra Kiel. DP3003 Collective Decisions with Interdependent Valuations. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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