| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3004 |
| DP3004 Industrial Clusters: Equilibrium, Welfare and Policy | |
| Anthony Venables; Victor D Norman | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-10-27 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations. Many of these relationships are long-term and provide repeated game incentives for performance. We experimentally investigate interaction effects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives in two treatments (one-shot and repeated) of a gift-exchange game. In both treatments we observe reciprocity, which is strengthened in the repeated game. A detailed analysis shows that in the repeated game some subjects imitate reciprocity. Thus, reciprocity and repeated game incentives reinforce each other. Observed behaviour is robust against experience. We conclude that a long-term interaction is a ?reciprocity-compatible? contract enforcement device. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Reciprocity Reputation Repeated games Incomplete contracts |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3004 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532066 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Anthony Venables,Victor D Norman. DP3004 Industrial Clusters: Equilibrium, Welfare and Policy. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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