| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3039 |
| DP3039 Does Entry Regulation Hinder Job Creation? Evidence from the French Retail Industry | |
| francis kramarz; Marianne Bertrand | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-11-01 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In a world with asymmetric information, contractual terms are an important incentive device. This Paper studies the effect of crop characteristics on the choice between short-term and long-term tenancy contracts and on the choice between sharecropping and fixed-rent contracts when the production process depends on two non-contractibles: effort devoted to current production and effort devoted to plant and soil maintenance. Long-term contracts are effective in providing incentives for non-contractible maintenance investment. Since, however, incentive provision is costly, long-term contracts will be employed only when, due to the characteristics of the crop, maintenance benefits are high, or when, due to the characteristics of the tenant, the cost of providing incentives is low. The predictions of the theory are tested on a unique data set containing 705 tenancy contracts signed between 1870 and 1880 in the province of Syracuse (Sicily). The empirical evidence shows that, indeed, long-term contracts were used if the crops grown had higher maintenance needs. Other comparative static results are derived and tested empirically. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Tenancy Rural contracts Contract duration |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3039 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532071 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | francis kramarz,Marianne Bertrand. DP3039 Does Entry Regulation Hinder Job Creation? Evidence from the French Retail Industry. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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