| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3046 |
| DP3046 Rich Nations, Poor Nations: How Much can Multiple Equilibria Explain? | |
| Jonathan Temple; Bryan S Graham | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-11-01 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper explores the optimal interaction between the tax system and unemployment compensation in insuring people against the risks of involuntary unemployment and low ability. To that end, we introduce search unemployment in a model of optimal non-linear income taxation. We find that the optimal search subsidy (i.e. the difference between the in-work benefit and the unemployment benefit) increases if, for efficient agents, the participation constraint (governing job search) becomes relatively more important than the incentive compatibility constraint (determining hours worked). The relation between unemployment benefits and the optimal level of in-work benefits (the number of people exerting positive work effort) is U (inversely U) shaped. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Search In-work tax benefits Unemployment compensation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3046 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532077 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jonathan Temple,Bryan S Graham. DP3046 Rich Nations, Poor Nations: How Much can Multiple Equilibria Explain?. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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