G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP3046
DP3046 Rich Nations, Poor Nations: How Much can Multiple Equilibria Explain?
Jonathan Temple; Bryan S Graham
发表日期2001-11-01
出版年2001
语种英语
摘要This Paper explores the optimal interaction between the tax system and unemployment compensation in insuring people against the risks of involuntary unemployment and low ability. To that end, we introduce search unemployment in a model of optimal non-linear income taxation. We find that the optimal search subsidy (i.e. the difference between the in-work benefit and the unemployment benefit) increases if, for efficient agents, the participation constraint (governing job search) becomes relatively more important than the incentive compatibility constraint (determining hours worked). The relation between unemployment benefits and the optimal level of in-work benefits (the number of people exerting positive work effort) is U (inversely U) shaped.
主题Public Economics
关键词Search In-work tax benefits Unemployment compensation
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp3046
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532077
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jonathan Temple,Bryan S Graham. DP3046 Rich Nations, Poor Nations: How Much can Multiple Equilibria Explain?. 2001.
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