G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP3050
DP3050 Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages
Kai Konrad
发表日期2001-11-01
出版年2001
语种英语
摘要Many collective decision problems have the common feature that individuals' desired outcomes are correlated but not identical. This Paper studies collective decisions with private information about these desired policies. Each agent holds private information that mainly concerns their own bliss point, but this private information also affects all other agents' bliss points. We concentrate on two specific mechanisms, the mean and the median mechanism. We establish existence of two symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria of the corresponding game and compare the performance of the mechanisms for different degrees of interdependencies. Applications of our framework include the assignment of voting rights in the council of the European Central Bank, the design of decision processes in teams, firms and international organizations.
主题International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics
关键词Collective decisions Asymmetric information Interdependent valuations
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp3050
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532081
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Kai Konrad. DP3050 Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages. 2001.
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