G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP3054
DP3054 Cost of Delay, Deadlines and Endogenous Price Leadership
Tuvana Pastine; Ivan Pastine
发表日期2001-11-11
出版年2001
语种英语
摘要We study and endogenous growth model where a profit-motivated R&D sector coexists with the introduction of free blueprints invented by philanthropists. These goods are priced at marginal cost, contrary to proprietary ones, which are produced by a monopoly owned by the inventor. We show that philanthropy does not necessarily increase long-run growth and that it may even reduce welfare. The reason is that it crowds our proprietary innovation, which on net may reduce total innovation in the long run. These effects would be reinforced if philanthropical inventors sometimes came out with another version of an existing proprietary good. Dynamics can also be characterized and it is shown that the impact effect of free inventions on growth is positive.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Innovation R&d Growth Open source Philanthropy Monopoly Imperfect competition Software industry
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp3054
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532089
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Tuvana Pastine,Ivan Pastine. DP3054 Cost of Delay, Deadlines and Endogenous Price Leadership. 2001.
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