| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3073 |
| DP3073 Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control | |
| Oliver Hart; Lucian Arye Bebchuk | |
| 发表日期 | 2001-11-11 |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | General equilibrium analysis of layoff costs have had mixed messages on the implications for employment. This Paper brings out the economic forces at work and explains the disparate results. Specifically, we show that positive employment effects of layoff costs come through reducing labour reallocation, whereas negative effects come through reducing the private return to work due to those layoff costs and the associated inefficient allocation of labour. Additional adverse employment effects can arise through an increase in the effective bargaining strength of workers. These forces explain why layoff costs tend to increase employment in search models while the opposite is true in models with employment lotteries. In matching models, we show that the employment effects depend critically on how layoff costs are assumed to enter the bargaining process. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Layoff costs Unemployment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3073 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532103 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Oliver Hart,Lucian Arye Bebchuk. DP3073 Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
