G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP3099
DP3099 Redistribution and Education Subsidies are Siamese Twins
Lans Bovenberg; Bas Jacobs
发表日期2001-12-12
出版年2001
语种英语
摘要?This Paper considers monetary policy when the weight policy makers put on output loss relative to inflation is their private information. I show that in the first period of a two-period term, all policy makers but the least inflation averse inflate less ? but respond more to shocks ? than if there were no private information. Moderately inflation-averse policy makers may reduce their inflation most. A tendency toward increased conservatism in their second period increases inflation in the first. The model is extended to T-period terms, T < 8. It is shown that inflation depends solely on the policy maker?s time left in office and not how long he has served or what he has already done. With unchanging preferences and no discounting, inflation is lower the longer he has left.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词monetary policy Signalling
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp3099
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532127
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Lans Bovenberg,Bas Jacobs. DP3099 Redistribution and Education Subsidies are Siamese Twins. 2001.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Lans Bovenberg]的文章
[Bas Jacobs]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Lans Bovenberg]的文章
[Bas Jacobs]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Lans Bovenberg]的文章
[Bas Jacobs]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。