| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3148 |
| DP3148 Macroeconomic Sources of FOREX Risk | |
| Michael R. Wickens; Peter N Smith | |
| 发表日期 | 2002 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Historical records show that the Sicilian mafia initially developed to protect land from predatory attacks, at a time when publicly provided security was scarce and banditry widespread. Using a common-agency model, the Paper shows that: (i) it is optimal for each landowner to voluntarily buy protection even if this results in a worse equilibrium for the landowning class as a whole and (ii) other things equal, mafia profits are higher where land is more fragmented. The argument is based on the fact that protection involves an externality because by buying protection each landowner deflects thieves on others? properties. Because of the externality, for each landlord protection is more valuable if they are one of the few to receive it, thus each landlord will be willing to pay more if some landlords are left out. Land fragmentation increases the number of landlords who would pay to keep some out, which in turn increases mafia?s profits. Using qualitative data from a parliamentary survey (1881), the Paper also shows that in 19th century rural Sicily mafia was in fact more likely to be active in towns were land was more divided. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Protection Property rights enforcement Common agency Scicily-history |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3148 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532167 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael R. Wickens,Peter N Smith. DP3148 Macroeconomic Sources of FOREX Risk. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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