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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP3173 |
DP3173 Stock Market Quality in the Prescence of a Traded Option | |
Kees Koedijk; Cyriel de Jong; Charles Schnitzlein | |
发表日期 | 2002-01-04 |
出版年 | 2002 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | The distribution of property rights has a strong impact on output when, due to the non-contractibility of some inputs, market contracts do not yield efficient outcomes. In this Paper I analyse how the distribution of land rights affects the choice of both contractible techniques ? such as crop mix or irrigation ? and non-contractible effort when these are complements in production. I present evidence from rural Nicaragua suggesting that farmers are more likely to grow effort-intensive/highly profitable crops on the plots they own rather than on the plots they rent. I consider two theoretical arguments that illustrate why property rights might matter. The first relies on the fact that the agent who chooses effort is subject to a limited liability constraint, the second that the owner cannot commit to output-contingent contracts. In both models the choice of technique might be inefficient, regardless of the distribution of property rights. The efficiency loss is, however, lower when the farmer owns the land. Further empirical investigation shows that, in this context, the inability to commit seems to be the main source of inefficiency. |
主题 | Public Economics |
关键词 | Agricultural productivity Asymmetric information Crop choices |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3173 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532175 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kees Koedijk,Cyriel de Jong,Charles Schnitzlein. DP3173 Stock Market Quality in the Prescence of a Traded Option. 2002. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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