G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP3168
DP3168 What Do State-Owned Firms Maximize? Evidence from the Italian Banks
Paola Sapienza
发表日期2002-01-07
出版年2002
语种英语
摘要Public corporations live in a dynamic and ever-changing business environment. This Paper examines how courts and legislators should choose default arrangements in the corporate area to address new circumstances. We show that the interests of the shareholders of existing companies would not be served by adopting those default arrangements that public officials view as most likely to be value enhancing. Because any charter amendment requires the board?s initiative, opting out of an inefficient default arrangement is much more likely to occur when management disfavours the arrangement than management supports it. We develop a ?reversible defaults? approach that takes into account this asymmetry. When public officials must choose between two or more default arrangements and face significant uncertainty as to which one would best serve shareholders, they should err in favour of the arrangement that is less favourable to managers. Such an approach, we show, would make it most likely that companies would be ultimately governed by the arrangement that would maximize shareholder value. Evaluating some of the main choices that state corporate law has made in the past two decades in light of our proposed approach, we endorse some but question others. The arrangements we examine include those developed with respect to director liability, state antitakeover statutes, and the range of permitted defensive tactics.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Shareholders Managers Directors Default rules Interpretation Takeovers Antitakeover statutes Poison pill Staggered boards
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp3168
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532176
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Paola Sapienza. DP3168 What Do State-Owned Firms Maximize? Evidence from the Italian Banks. 2002.
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