| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3147 |
| DP3147 Reciprocity and the Political Economy of Harmonization and Mutual Recognition of Regulatory Measures | |
| Thierry Verdier; Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-01-17 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Economists who believe that government is essentially benevolent tend to regard inter-governmental competition as a source of negative externalities that lower welfare. In contrast the public choice perspective, particularly that motivated by the Leviathan model, sees such competition as potentially beneficial. This Paper considers a world consisting of politicians of both kinds ? self-interested and welfare maximizing. Imperfect information prevents identification of the latter. We model the political equilibrium of the model and then examine the consequences of introducing competition for mobile resources or yardstick competition. In both cases there is a trade-off between effects on politician discipline and selection. Contrary to the existing view, we show that competition is most likely to be welfare improving for voters when it is more likely that politicians are benevolent and bad for welfare when it is most likely that politicians are of the rent seeking type. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3147 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532183 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thierry Verdier,Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann. DP3147 Reciprocity and the Political Economy of Harmonization and Mutual Recognition of Regulatory Measures. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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