| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP3165
|
| DP3165 Outsourcing in a Global Economy |
| Elhanan Helpman; Gene Grossman
|
| 发表日期 | 2002-01-20
|
| 出版年 | 2002
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | The Paper analyses a standard Downsian model of election with two opportunistic parties. We assume that, after choosing their ideological position but before the election takes place, parties can affect the quality of their platforms by exerting some unobservable effort. When voters either (almost) always or (almost) never observe the resulting quality before the election, the standard Median Voter Theorem holds. For the more general case of imperfect observability of quality, however, we show that parties may optimally deviate from the median voter?s bliss point as an implicit commitment to exert high effort (and therefore obtain a high-quality platform). The Paper thus argues that extremist parties are endogenously more committed to their ideas than moderate parties. Moreover, the extra quality implied by the divergence of parties will sometimes offset their worse ideology proposed, in which case the voters? welfare under divergence is greater than under convergence of platforms. Last, we endogenize the amount of information revealed to voters by assuming that a profit maximizing press collects the news about the quality of parties and sells it to the electorate. We show that the press may collect an amount of information that is excessively high from a social viewpoint. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Moral hazard
Median voter theorem
Party competition
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3165
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532191
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Elhanan Helpman,Gene Grossman. DP3165 Outsourcing in a Global Economy. 2002.
|
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