| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3175 |
| DP3175 Discrimination and Nepotism: The Efficiency of the Anonymity Rule | |
| Chaim Fershtman; Frank Verboven; Uri Gneezy | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-01-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper presents a model of takeover incentives in an oligopolistic industry, which, in contrast to previous approaches, takes both insiders' and outsiders' gains from an increase in industry concentration into account. Our main application is to compare takeover incentives in a differentiated Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly model with linear demand and costs. We provide a complete analysis for arbitrary numbers of firms, complements and substitutes, and degrees of product differentiation. An increase in concentration is more likely under Cournot competition if products are complements and more likely under Bertrand competition if products are substitutes. Moreover, as products become closer substitutes, a takeover becomes more likely under Bertrand and less likely under Cournot competition. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Merger Takeover bidding Oligopoly |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3175 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532198 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Chaim Fershtman,Frank Verboven,Uri Gneezy. DP3175 Discrimination and Nepotism: The Efficiency of the Anonymity Rule. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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