G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP3175
DP3175 Discrimination and Nepotism: The Efficiency of the Anonymity Rule
Chaim Fershtman; Frank Verboven; Uri Gneezy
发表日期2002-01-20
出版年2002
语种英语
摘要This Paper presents a model of takeover incentives in an oligopolistic industry, which, in contrast to previous approaches, takes both insiders' and outsiders' gains from an increase in industry concentration into account. Our main application is to compare takeover incentives in a differentiated Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly model with linear demand and costs. We provide a complete analysis for arbitrary numbers of firms, complements and substitutes, and degrees of product differentiation. An increase in concentration is more likely under Cournot competition if products are complements and more likely under Bertrand competition if products are substitutes. Moreover, as products become closer substitutes, a takeover becomes more likely under Bertrand and less likely under Cournot competition.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Merger Takeover bidding Oligopoly
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp3175
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532198
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Chaim Fershtman,Frank Verboven,Uri Gneezy. DP3175 Discrimination and Nepotism: The Efficiency of the Anonymity Rule. 2002.
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