G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP3180
DP3180 Platform Divergence, Political Efficiency and the Median Voter Theorem
Micael Castanheira; Juan Carrillo
发表日期2002-01-20
出版年2002
语种英语
摘要We construct a set of indicators to measure the policy-making role of the European Union (European Council, Parliament, Commission, Court of Justice, etc.), in a selected number of policy domains. Our goal is to examine the division of prerogatives between European institutions and national ones, in light of the implications of normative models and in relation to the preferences of European citizens. Our data confirm that the extent and the intensity of policy-making by the EU have increased sharply over the last 30 years. Such increase has taken place at different speeds, and to different degrees, across policy domains. In recent times the areas that have expanded most are the most remote from the EEC's original mission of establishing a free market zone with common external trade policy. We conjecture that the resulting allocation may be partly inconsistent with normative criteria concerning the assignment of policies at different government levels, as laid out in the theoretical literature.
主题Public Economics
关键词European union Political economy Subsidarity
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp3180
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532203
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Micael Castanheira,Juan Carrillo. DP3180 Platform Divergence, Political Efficiency and the Median Voter Theorem. 2002.
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