| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3185 |
| DP3185 Psychological Foundations of Incentives | |
| Ernst Fehr; Armin Falk | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-01-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper studies the objective function of state-owned banks. Using information on individual loan contracts, I compare the interest rate charged to two sets of companies with identical characteristics borrowing respectively from state-owned and privately owned banks. State-owned banks charge lower interest rates than do privately owned banks to similar or identical firms, even if the company is able to borrow more from privately owned banks. State-owned banks mostly favour firms located in depressed areas and large firms. The lending behaviour of state-owned banks is affected by the electoral results of the party affiliated with the bank: the stronger the political party in the area where the firm is borrowing, the lower the interest rates charged. This result is robust to including bank and firm fixed effects. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Government Ownership |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3185 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532207 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ernst Fehr,Armin Falk. DP3185 Psychological Foundations of Incentives. 2002. |
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