| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3188 |
| DP3188 How Transparent are Central Banks? | |
| Sylvester Eijffinger; Petra Geraats | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-02-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a dynamic model of price regulation with asymmetric information where strategic delegation is available to the regulator. Firms can sink non- contractible, cost-reducing investment but regulators cannot commit to future price levels. We fully characterize the Perfect Bayesian equilibria and show that, with incentive contracts but without delegation, under- and over-investment can occur. We then show that delegation to a suitable regulator can both improve investment incentives and ameliorate the ratchet effect by credibly offering the firm future rent. Simulations indicate significant welfare gains from these two effects and that a wide range of regulatory preferences can achieve this result. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Under investment Commitment Price regulation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3188 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532217 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sylvester Eijffinger,Petra Geraats. DP3188 How Transparent are Central Banks?. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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