| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP3190
|
| DP3190 If You're so Smart, Why Aren't You Rich? Wage Inequality with Heterogenous Workers? |
| Alison Booth; Gylfi Zoega
|
| 发表日期 | 2002-02-20
|
| 出版年 | 2002
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We examine the relation between optimal venture capital contracts and the supply and demand for venture capital. Both the composition and type of financial claims held by the venture capitalist and entrepreneur depend on the market structure. Moreover, different market structures involve different optimal forms of transferring utility: sometimes it is optimal to transfer utility via equity stakes, sometimes it is optimal to use debt. Transferring utility via equity stakes affects incentives. Consequently, the net value created, the success probability, the market (or IPO) value, and the performance of venture-capital backed investments all depend on the supply and demand for capital. Similarly, venture capitalists face different incentives to screen projects ex ante if the capital supply is low or high. We then endogenize the capital supply and study the relation between venture capital contracts and entry costs, public policy, investment profitability, and market transparency. Finally, we show that entry by inexperienced investors creates a negative externality for the value creation in ventures financed by (regular) venture capitalists. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
; Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Venture capital
Optimal contracting
Market structure
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3190
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532219
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Alison Booth,Gylfi Zoega. DP3190 If You're so Smart, Why Aren't You Rich? Wage Inequality with Heterogenous Workers?. 2002.
|
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
