| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3216 |
| DP3216 Information and the Optimal Ownership Structure of Firms | |
| Niko Matouschek | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-02-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper studies the determinants of executive turnover and firm valuation as a function of ownership and control structure in Italy, a country that features low legal protection for investors, firms with controlling shareholders, and pyramidal groups. The results suggest that there is poor governance, as measured by a low sensitivity of turnover to performance and a low Q ratio, when (i) the controlling shareholders are also top executives, (ii) the control is fully in the hands of one shareholder and is not shared by a set of core shareholders, and (iii) the controlling shareholders own less than 50% of the firm?s cash-flow rights. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Executive turnover Corporate governance Pyramidal groups |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3216 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532242 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Niko Matouschek. DP3216 Information and the Optimal Ownership Structure of Firms. 2002. |
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