| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP3227
|
| DP3227 Explaining Leakage of Public Funds |
| Jakob Svensson; Ritva Reinikka
|
| 发表日期 | 2002-02-20
|
| 出版年 | 2002
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | The modern theory of agrarian organization has studied how the economic environment determines organizational form under the assumption of stable property rights to land. The political economy literature has modeled the endogenous determination of property rights. In this Paper we propose a model in which the economic organization of agriculture and the political equilibrium determining the distribution of property rights are jointly determined. In particular, because the form of organization may affect the probability and distribution of benefits from agrarian reform, it may be determined in anticipation of this impact. The model offers a reason for why tenancy, despite its economic advantages, has been so little used in countries where agrarian reform is a salient political issue. We argue that this in particular helps to understand the dearth of tenancy and the relative failure of land reform in Latin America. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Agrarian organization
Political economy
Land reform
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3227
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532252
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Jakob Svensson,Ritva Reinikka. DP3227 Explaining Leakage of Public Funds. 2002.
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