| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3236 |
| DP3236 Using Stationarity Tests in Antitrust Market Definition | |
| Mario Forni | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-02-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper studies a particular kind of gaming response to explicit incentives in a large government organization. The gaming responses we consider occur when agents strategically report their performance outcomes to maximize their awards. An important contribution of this work is to examine whether this behaviour diverts resources (eg agents' time) from productive activities or whether it simply reflects an accounting phenomenon. We evaluate the efficiency impact of the behaviour we identify and find that it has a negative impact on the true goal of the organization. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Performance incentives Contract theory Moral hazard Multi tasking Government incentives |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3236 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532261 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mario Forni. DP3236 Using Stationarity Tests in Antitrust Market Definition. 2002. |
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