| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3240 |
| DP3240 Overbidding versus Fire-Sales in Bankruptcy Auctions | |
| B Espen Eckbo; Karin S. Thorburn | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-03-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Markets that are not completely transparent feature complex comparative statics with respect to the effect of number of firms, elasticity of substitution between goods and degree of transparency on equilibrium prices. The main result is that the following 'common wisdom' is incorrect: more transparent markets always feature lower prices, higher consumer welfare and lower price dispersion. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | transparency Substitution Prices |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3240 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532271 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | B Espen Eckbo,Karin S. Thorburn. DP3240 Overbidding versus Fire-Sales in Bankruptcy Auctions. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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