| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3248 |
| DP3248 Innovating Firms and Aggregate Innovation | |
| Tor Jakob Klette; Samuel S Kortum | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-03-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We construct a simple model where political elites may block technological and institutional development, because of a ?political replacement effect.? Innovations often erode elites? incumbency advantage, increasing the likelihood that they will be replaced. Fearing replacement, political elites are unwilling to initiate change, and may even block economic development. We show that elites are unlikely to block development when there is a high degree of political competition, or when they are highly entrenched. It is only when political competition is limited and also their power is threatened that elites will block development. We also show that such blocking is more likely to arise when political stakes are higher, and that external threats may reduce the incentives to block. We argue that this model provides an interpretation for why Britain, Germany and the US industrialized during the nineteenth century, while the landed aristocracy in Russia and Austria-Hungary blocked development. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Political economy Institutions Development Industrialization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3248 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532276 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Tor Jakob Klette,Samuel S Kortum. DP3248 Innovating Firms and Aggregate Innovation. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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