| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP3260
|
| DP3260 Can Labour Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? Evidence from India |
| Tim Besley
|
| 发表日期 | 2002-03-20
|
| 出版年 | 2002
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We provide experimental evidence that contractual incompleteness, ie, the absence of third party enforcement of workers? effort or the quality of the good traded causes a fundamental change in the nature of market interactions. If contracts are complete the vast majority of trades are initiated by public offers. Most trades take place in one-shot transactions and the contracting parties are indifferent with regard to the identity of their trading partner. Moreover, the short side of the market attempts to appropriate the whole gains from trade, which causes much disagreement about contract terms. If contracts are incomplete the vast majority of trades are initiated by private offers. The contracting parties form long-term relations and the provision of low effort or bad quality is penalized by the termination of the relationship. The threat of terminating the relation turns out to be an extremely powerful discipline device. Markets with incomplete contracts resemble a collection of bilateral trading islands rather than a competitive market. The short side of the market shares the gains from trade with the long side of the market so that there is little disagreement about contract terms. Our results support theories of the labour market that are based on the idea that unemployment is a worker discipline device. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics
|
| 关键词 | Market interaction
Contract enforcement
Incomplete contract
Involuntary unemployment
Repeated transaction
Fairness preferences
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3260
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532287
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Tim Besley. DP3260 Can Labour Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? Evidence from India. 2002.
|
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