| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3264 |
| DP3264 Fixed-Term Contracts and the Duration Distribution of Unemployment | |
| maia guell | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-03-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that have external effects on other members of the organization. Because of contractual incompleteness, monetary incentives are insufficient to internalize these effects in the decision-maker?s objective. The optimal assignment of decision rights minimizes the resulting inefficiencies. We illustrate this in a principal?agent model where the principal retains the authority to select ?large? projects but delegates the decision right to the agent to implement ?small? projects. Extensions of the model discuss the role of effort incentives, asymmetric information and multi-stage decisions. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Authority Control rights Decision rights Delegation Externalities Incomplete contracts Theory of the firm |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3264 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532291 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | maia guell. DP3264 Fixed-Term Contracts and the Duration Distribution of Unemployment. 2002. |
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