| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3308 |
| DP3308 A Pint a Day Raises a Man's Pay; But Smoking Blows that Gain Away | |
| Jan C. van Ours | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-04-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper introduces a simple extensive form pricing game. The Bertrand outcome is a Nash equilibrium outcome in this game, but it is not necessarily subgame perfect. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcome features the following comparative static properties. The more similar firms are, the higher the equilibrium price. Further, a new firm that enters the industry or an existing firm that becomes more efficient can raise the equilibrium price. The subgame perfect equilibrium is used to formalize price leadership, joint dominance and efficiency offence. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Bertrand paradox Price leadership Mergers Joint dominance Efficiency offense |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3308 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532334 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jan C. van Ours. DP3308 A Pint a Day Raises a Man's Pay; But Smoking Blows that Gain Away. 2002. |
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