| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP3316
|
| DP3316 One Third of the World's Growth and Inequality |
| Danny Quah
|
| 发表日期 | 2002-04-20
|
| 出版年 | 2002
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | In a stochastic environment, with political constraints, we analyse the behavior of a fully funded system, whose portfolio is composed of a risk free and a risky asset. When an aggregate negative shock hits, a large share of the wealth of the elderly is wiped out and office-seeking policy-makers ?bail them out,? by instituting a long-lasting PAYG system. Under these political constraints, a fully funded system suffers from a moral hazard problem, since agents have an incentive to choose a riskier portfolio, which increases the wealth loss associated with the bad state. The introduction of a mixed system reduces the riskiness of the portfolio, which remains however higher than in the case of no policy-maker?s intervention. Furthermore, the early adoption of a mixed system, previous to the occurrence of a negative shock, eliminates the policy-maker?s incentive to intervene, albeit at a high cost. In fact, its unfunded pillar would be larger than the PAYG system introduced in the case of a bad shock. In our dynamically efficient economy, this would amount to impose an extra loss on all future generations. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Fully funded
Political bailout
Moral hazard
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3316
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532342
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Danny Quah. DP3316 One Third of the World's Growth and Inequality. 2002.
|
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
