| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3336 |
| DP3336 Independence before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design | |
| Andrew Hughes Hallett; Diana Weymark | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-04-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper provides a baseline general-equilibrium model of optimal monetary policy among interdependent economies with monopolistic firms and nominal rigidities. An inward-looking policy of complete domestic output stabilization is not optimal when firms' markups are exposed to currency fluctuations. Such policy raises exchange rate volatility, leading foreign exporters to charge higher prices vis-a-vis the increased uncertainty in the export market. As higher import prices reduce the purchasing power of domestic consumers, optimal monetary rules trade off a larger domestic output gap against lower consumer prices. Optimal rules in a world Nash equilibrium lead to less exchange rate volatility relative to both inward-looking rules and discretionary policies, even when the latter do not suffer from any inflationary (or deflationary) bias. Gains from international monetary cooperation are related in a non-monotonic way to the degree of exchange rate pass-through. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Optimal yclical monetary policy Nominal rigidities Exchange rate pass-through International cooperation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3336 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532359 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew Hughes Hallett,Diana Weymark. DP3336 Independence before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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