| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3339 |
| DP3339 The Complexity of Economic Policy: I. Restricted Local Optima in Tax Policy Design | |
| Gilles Saint-Paul | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-04-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This Paper uses a large new panel data set to examine the relationship between elections and fiscal policy. We find clear evidence of political business cycles in macroeconomic policy: spending increases before elections while revenues fall, leading to a larger deficit in election years. We also show that there are large systematic differences between developed and developing countries in the size and composition of the electoral policy cycles. We propose a moral hazard model of electoral competition to explain these differences. In the model, the sizes of the electoral budget cycles depend on the rents of remaining in power and the share of informed voters in the electorate. Using suitable proxies, we find that these institutional features explain a large part of the difference in policy cycles between developed and developing countries. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Political budget cycles Dynamic panel estimation Developing countries |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3339 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532362 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gilles Saint-Paul. DP3339 The Complexity of Economic Policy: I. Restricted Local Optima in Tax Policy Design. 2002. |
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