| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP3345 |
| DP3345 Disclosures and Asset Returns | |
| Hyun Song Shin | |
| 发表日期 | 2002-04-20 |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Hierarchy can function as an instrument to channel influence activities or power struggles in organizations. Contrary to what has frequently been argued, we show that multi-divisional organizations may involve lower influence costs than single-tier organizations, even though they offer more scope for organizational conflict and have more executives that can be influenced. These benefits derive from two effects. First, part of the conflict in multi-divisional organizations takes place on the division level, where a small number of agents fight over only a fraction of the overall prize. Second, by grouping agents into common divisions, multi-divisional organizations create free-rider problems in rent seeking. We apply our framework to divestitures and the transition from the U- to the M-form by US corporations in the 1920s. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Hierarchy Conflict Influence activities U-form versus m-form |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp3345 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/532367 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hyun Song Shin. DP3345 Disclosures and Asset Returns. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Hyun Song Shin]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Hyun Song Shin]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Hyun Song Shin]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
